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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING A
PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY:
THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE
Shyamkrishna Balganesh*
Introduction
In the scheme of the Indian Constitution, the fundamental rights enumerated
in Part III, form a fundamental limitation on the powers of the state. This is evidenced
by Article 13(2), which provides that any law made, which abridges or abolishes
any of the rights in Part III, will to the extent of contravention, be void' . During an
emergency situation, where the security of the nation is at stake, it is however,
essential that the state is equipped with adequate powers to deal with the situation
in the best possible manner. It therefore becomes necessary to remove the restriction
imposed on State power by Part III to a limited extent. At the same time, the
restrictions cannot be removed so as to completely obliterate individuals' rights.
Part XVIII of the Constitution, which contains the emergency provisions seeks to
provide a balance between the two ends; giving the State increased powers to deal
with the situation and at the same time ensuring that some of the basic rights in
Part III remain intact.
Over the last 50 years, an emergency on account of the security of the nation
being threatened has been proclaimed on three occassions. In 1962, during the
Chinese invasion, in 1971 during the conflict with Pakistan and once again in 1975
on account of internal disturbance2 . On all three occasions, the judiciary has had
occasion to examine the impact of the proclamation on fundamental rights.
II Year, B.A.,LL.B (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
1 An important point to note is that while Article 13(2) renders any law so made void at its very
inception, an existing law, i.e., a law that was in force prior to the commencement of the
constitution, is not rendered void in a similar manner. For such an existing law, there exists in
Article 13(1) a provision referred to as the 'doctrine of eclipse'. Accordingly, when the constitution
came into force in 1950, any existing law that contravened any of the rights in Part m did not
cease to exist as a whole. The part of the law that contravened Part III would only remain
suspended. Subsequently, if by any constitutional amendment, the law no longer contravened
Part In, it would become operational. This is not the case for a post-constitutional law. Even if
an amendment does away with the contravention, the law would not become operational because
it is considered still-born and void ab initio. See, Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P., AIR
1955 SC 781; Madhu Limaye v. S. D. M. Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC 746; SaghirAhmed v. State of
U.R, AIR 1954 SC 728; Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648; MahendraInl Jainiv.
State of U.., AIR 1963 SC 1019.
2 J.N. Pandey, ConstitutionalLaw of India, 461 (1989). In 1962, the emergency was
proclaimed
on account of war and external aggression, in 1971 on similar grounds and in
1975 on the
ground of 'internal disturbance'. It is important to note that by the 44th Amendment in 1978, the
ground of 'internal disturbance' was replaced by that of 'armed rebellion'.
*
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The Constitutional Provisions - Articles 358 and 359
The phrase 'proclamation of emergency' is defined in Article 366 of the
Constitution, as a proclamation made under Article 352(1). Article 352, in turn
deals with a national emergency whereby the security of India is threatened. The
three conditions where such a threat may arise, as specified in clause (1) are- war,
external aggression or armed rebellion.
The specific provisions of Part XVIII which deal with the position of
fundamental rights during a proclamation under Article 352 are Article 358 and
Article 359. Article 358 provides for the suspension of the provisions in Article
19, during a proclamation while Article 359 provides for the suspension of the
enforcement of certain rights during a proclamation. This is the principal point of
difference' between the two; that while one provides for the suspension of the
entire right, the other provides that by an order the president can only suspend the
enforcement of certain rights, i.e., the remedy. It is often misunderstood that both
provide for the suspension of the entire right.
Further, while it may seem that the suspension of the enforceability of a
fundamental right has the same effect as the suspension of the right per se, this is
not true. In the event of the right to move the court for the enforcement being
suspended, the rights remain theoretically alive4 . As a result, only the right of the
individual to approach the court is taken away. Hence, the court still has the power
to enforce a right, if it so wishes, suo motos.
The Emergency of 1962:
The first time a national emergency was proclaimed in India was in 1962,
when the Chinese attacked the North-East Frontier Area (NEFA). The emergency
was proclaimed on the ground that the security of India was threatened by war and
external aggression. As a result of this proclamation, Article 358 automatically
3 Other differences also exist between the two. While Article 358 comes into effect immediately
upon the proclamation under Article 352, for Article 359 to come into force a Presidential order
is necessary. The Presidential order is to be placed before the Parliament and must obtain
parliamentary approval for it to come into force. Further, the suspension under Article 358
continued for the entire duration of the emergency, while the order under Article 359 will
continue for the duration specified in the order.
4 Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 381, 387.
5 For instance, in pursuance off the power granted to the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, to pass an order as is necessary to do 'complete justice' in any matter or cause
before it. Thus, only the locus standi of the individual to enforce the rights is taken away and
not the courts' jurisdiction. See, Mohan Chowdhury v. Chief Commissioner Tripura,AIR 1964
SC 173.
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came into force thereby suspending the provisions of Article 19, empowering the
state to make any law in contravention of the rights contained therein. In pursuance
of this proclamation, the President passed an order under Article 359, whereby the
rights of an individual to enforce the rights contained in Articles 14, 21 and 22
were suspended if the rights were deprived by virtue of any action taken under the
Defence of India Ordinance , 19621.
1 An important point to take note of with regard to this order is that it was
conditional in two ways. One, that it suspended the right of individuals to enforce
only their rights contained in Articles 14, 21 and 228. Two, that it prohibited
enforcement only when the rights were deprived under the Defence of India Act'.
One of the first cases to come before the Supreme Court where the scope
and effect of this order was examined was that of Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State
ofPunjab'o. The court in this case, pointed out the difference between the suspension
of the right under Article 358 and the suspension of the enforcement under Article
359. An important proposition to emerge from this case was that in seeking to
enforce the rights of the detenu, the courts had to look at the substance of the order
and not itsfonn. As a result, it could not resort to other provisions under different
statutes, which would have the effect of enforcing a right, which was to be curtailed
by the order".
The most important proposition of law laid down by the court in this case
was that while the order forbade a challenge to an order of detention under the
Articles specifically mentioned, it did not prevent a challenge on other grounds.
6 Which later became the Defence of India Act, 1962.
7 For the exact words of the order See, Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of
India, 436 (1970).
8 This is with specific reference to the order under Article 359. Apart from this, the rights in
Article 19 were automatically suspended.
9 Thus the order was bi-conditional, a factor referred to in later decisions. This order is to be
contrasted with that of 1971, which was uni-conditional.
10 Supra., n. 4. This case involved a series of 26 petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. The
detenus were detained in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30 of the Defence of India
Act. The court in this case examined in detail the true scope of a Presidential order under
Article 359.
11 This was in the context of the petitioners raising the argument that the Presidential order did
not restrict the power of the court to grant a writ of habeas corpus under Sec. 491(1)(b)
of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and concluded
that
the courts did not have the power to do indirectly what they could not do directly. Thus,
any
remedy under Article 32, Article 226 and Sec. 491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
would have the same effect and was therefore impermissible.
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Thus, the detenu could still challenge the order on the basis of other rights and on
grounds such as malafide, excessive delegation, improper application of the law
and the like". The detenu was not altogether without any remedy. While the
petitioners. were unsuccessful in proving any of these alternate grounds to set
aside the order of detention, nevertheless in several subsequent decisions the
Supreme Court has applied this proposition".
The next important question that arose before the Supreme Court, was
whether the order issued under Article 359 could be challenged on the basis of the
very rights it sought to prohibit the enforcement of. In the case of Ghulam Sarwar
v. Union ofIndial4 , the petitioner challenged the validity of the Presidential order
issued under Article 359, on the ground of it violating Article 14, the very right it
sought to prevent the enforcement of. Surprisingly, the court allowed such a
challenge. The court drew a distinction between the order per se and the effect of
the order. Thus, if the order was in itself violative of Part III, then it would be
void" and would not result in the suspension of the remedies in the Articles
mentioned. While this proposition was put forth, the court examined the order and
came to the conclusion that it was in fact a reasonable classification and not violative
of Article 14.
12 An important observation made by the court however, was that in the event of a challenge to the
Defence of India Act being allowed and the Act being held invalid, then it would still amount to
an enforcement of the detenu's right to life under Article 21, which was prohibited. See, supra.,
n. 4 at p.386.
13 See, DurgaDas Shiraliv. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1078, where a challenge was permitted
on the ground of malafide; Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secretary, Government of Madras, AIR
1966 SC 657, where a challenge was permitted on the grounds of mala fide and excessive
delegation; JaichandLal v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1967 SC 483, where a challenge was
permitted on the additional ground of the detaining authority not applying its mind; State of
Maharashtrav. PrabhakarPandurangSanzgiri, AIR 1966 SC 424, where the detention order
was set aside on the ground of mala fide; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC
740, where the order was set aside on the ground of it not being in strict compliance with the
Defence of India Act; JagannathMisra v. State of Orissa,AIR 1966 SC 1140, where the order
was set aside for being in contravention of Sec. 40 of the Defence of India Act; Sadanandanv.
State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1925, where the order was set aside on the ground of malafide.
A similar application of this principle was also done by the High Courts. See, Benoy Kumar v.
State of West Bengal, AIR 1966 Cal 509, where the order was set aside on the ground of mala
fide; Bhola Rai v. Superintendent, DistrictJail, Ghazipur, AIR 1967 All 77, where the order
was set aside upon the petitioner proving that the detention was based on an illusory ground.
14 AIR 1967 SC 1335. In this case, the petitioner was a foreign national who was caught travelling
without any documents. He was therefore put in detention. The first Presidential order issued
on 31-10-1962, provided for the detention of foreign nationals alone. This was challenged as
being violative of the equality clause contained in Article 14.
15 By virtue of Articlo 13(2), which provides that any law made in contravention of the rights
contained in Part III would be rendered void to the extent of the contravention. The term 'law'
is defined in Article 13(3)(a) to include an order having the force of law.
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While this proposition may have been technically sound, if it is looked at
realistically, it defeats the entire purpose of the order under Article 359. It was
therefore overruled by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yakub v.
State ofJ&K'6 . Here, the court rightly pointed out that the Presidential order under
Article 359 and Article 13(2) had to be constructed harmoniously, so as to prevent
either being rendered nugatory. Thus, the court interpreted the word 'law' in Article
13(3)(a) to exclude a presidential order under Article 359. This approach taken by
the court seems to be more practical and would not defeat the very purpose of the
Presidential order, which is to remove a fetter on the State's power to a limited
extent.
Several decisions of the Supreme Court and the various High Courts followed
these main propositions' 7 . Another important point laid down by the courts, was
that Article 358 and an order under Article 359 could not validate a pre-emergency
law which was invalid ab initio. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. BharatSingh'",
the court held that the automatic suspension of the rights under Article 19 during
an emergency could not be used to validate a pre-emergency law. This was in
keeping with the recognition that for a post-constitutional law, the doctrine of
eclipse did not operate and therefore, such a law if it contravened any of the
provisions in Part III, would to the extent of such a contravention be rendered void
ab initio19 .
During the emergency of 1962 and the Presidential order under Article 359
that followed, the impact on the fundamental rights in Part III was therefore kept
at a reasonable level. The interpretations given by the courts sought to strike a
balance between an individual's basic freedoms and the state's increased power to
deal with the situation. This was achieved by allowing challenges to detention
16 AIR 1968 SC 765. This was a series of 21 petitions seeking a writ of habeas corpus.The detenus
had been detained in accordance with Rule 30 of the Defence of India Act. The petitioners at the
very outset sought to challenge the Presidential order as not having any nexus with the security
of India and therefore being unnecessary. The court rejected this argument and concluded that
the very fact that it was issued assumed that it was in furtherance of the security of India.
17 See, Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1968 SC 327, where a challenge was
permitted on the ground of mala fide; District Collector Hyderabad v. Ibrahim & Co., (1970)
1 SCC 386, where a challenge on the ground of violation of Article 19(1)(g) was barred,
but a
challenge on the ground of statutory non-compliance was permitted; State of Maharashtra
v.
Lok Shikshan Sanstha, (1971) 2 SCC 410, where a challenge was permitted on other grounds.
18 AIR 1967 SC 1170.
19 This decision was relied upon in Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, AIR 1973
SC 106, where
the court held that Article 358 could not validate a law which was a
continuation of a preemergency law which was invalid. See also, PartapSingh v. State of Punjab, AIR
1975 P&H
324; Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 366, where
the same proposition was
restated.

Vol. 12]

FundamentalRights during a Proclamationof Emergency

29

orders on grounds other than those expressly prohibited. At the same time however,
if any indirect means were employed to circumvent the express provisions, such
means were also prohibited. The courts thus, gave the express provisions a wide
interpretation, and at the same time the width of such an interpretation was curbed
by preventing the reading of implicit grounds into them.
The Proclamation of 1962 continued till 1968. The Presidential order under
Article 359, also continued for the same duration.
The Emergencies of 1971 and 1975
In 1971, during the conflict with Pakistan, the President once again by a
proclamation under Article 352 brought into force an emergency on the ground
that the security of India was threatened by war. Before this emergency came to an
end, in 1975 again, an emergency was proclaimed on the ground that the security
was threatened owing to an 'internal disturbance' 20 . Both these emergencies came
to an end in 197721

In furtherance of these proclamations, the President in 1975 made an order
under Article 359 declaring that the right of any person to move any court for the
enforcement of the rights contained in Articles 14, 21 and 22 and all proceedings
pending in courts for the enforcement of the same stood suspended for the period
during which the proclamations of 1971 and 1975 were in force 22 .
While the order was similar to that of 1962, it differed in one important
aspect. While the earlier, one barred challenges only when a deprivation was made
under the Defence of India Act, the order of 1975 made no such categorisation.
Further, the order also provided for the suspension of all proceedings that were
pending before the courts for the enforcement of the mentioned rights.
With regard to the suspension of proceedings pending before the courts, the
question that immediately arose was with regard to the nature of the suspension.
In the event of an interlocutory injunction having already been granted, was it to
be lifted or was the entire proceeding to be frozen? Several High Courts took

20 As is stood then, 'internal disturbance' was a ground whereby the security of India could be
threatened so as to necessitate a proclamation of emergency under Article 352(1). By the 44th
Amendment Act, 1978 this ground has been replaced by that of 'armed rebellion'.
21 See, T. K. Tope, ConstitutionalLaw of India, 600 (1982).
22 For the exact order See, H. M. Seervai, ConstitutionalLaw of India: Vol. III, 1677 (1979).
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differing views on the issue 2 3 . While the exact position is still somewhat unclear,
the most appropriate position seems to be restoration of complete status quo ante.
This would even mean vacating an interim stay order if such an order had been
passed. Another similar point of controversy that arose was with regard to whether
suspension of Article 14, meant suspension of other Articles considered species of
Article 14, such as Articles 15 and 16. On this point too, the High Courts expressed
opposing opinions 24 .
The most important case that came before the Supreme Court with regard to
the Presidential order of 1975 was that of A.D.M., Jabalpurv. Shivakant Shukla".
This case has been regarded as one of the biggest blunders committed by the
Supreme Court since 1950. The court in this case came to the conclusion that in
view of the Presidential order under Article 359, no person had the locus standi at
all to approach either the High Court or the Supreme Court for any writ. The court
also concluded that a challenge to the detention order on other grounds not
mentioned in the Presidential order such as malafide, extraneous considerations,
etc. was also forbidden 26.
23 See, Raj Kumar v. Union oflndia, AIR 1976 HP 34, where the court held that though proceedings
were to be suspended it did not preclude the court from granting an interim injunction which
could be granted on the primafacie case and not on the merits. In K. P Singh v. State of Bihar,
AIR 1976 Pat 248, the court drew a distinction between the suspension of a proceeding and the
staying of a proceeding. The court held that suspension of a proceeding meant the vacation of a
stay order too, unless the stay order was the final relief being sought. In Jagadishv. Union of
India, AIR 1976 Cal 17, the court said that during a suspension of proceedings, the proceedings
were frozen. As a result, any interim injunction granted would remain. The court while recognising
that this could result in an undue advantage to one party, opined that the emergency situation
necessitated this.
24 In Arjun Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 Raj 217, the court opined that suspension of
Article 14 did not include the suspension of Article 16. The court interpreted the Presidential
order so as to ensure the preservation of as many fundamental rights as possible. The court
differed in its opinion from an earlier decision in Shyam Behariv. Union of India, AIR 1963 Ass
94, where the court had held that Article 16 being a species of the right to equality in Article 14,
was also suspended under the Presidential order of 1962.
25 AIR 1976 SC 1207: (1976) 2 SCC 521. Hereinafter referred to as the Habeas Corpus Case.
During the pendency of the proclamation under Article 352(1), certain drastic changes were
made to the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (hereinafter, the "MISA"). It provided for
more stringent forms of preventive detention. See, M.P. Jain, Indian ConstitutionalLaw, 730
(1994). This case related to a series of petitions filed seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The
detenus were detained under the MISA. The appeals came from High Courts from all around the
country and were heard by a bench consisting of A. N. Ray, C.J.,H. R. Khanna, M. H. Beg, Y. V.
Chandrachud and P. N. Bhagwati, JJ. The judgement was delivered by a majority of four, with
Justice Khanna being the sole dissenting voice.
26 Ibid. at p.1392. "In view of the Presidential Order...no person has locus standi to move any writ
petition under Art. 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or
direction to challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order is not in
compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factual or legal or is based on
extraneous considerations."
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The decision therefore prohibited any challenge to a detention order during
the emergency period, something that was expressly avoided in previous
decisions 27 . This decision would have far-reaching repercussions. It placed
unnecessary, unfettered power in the hands of the detaining authorities. In simple
terms, it granted the state authority to commit blatant violations of basic human
rights and get away without being accountable to anyone.
In Makhan Singh Tarsikka'scase28 , the court had reiterated that a challenge
to a detention order on grounds not mentioned in the Presidential order was
permissible. In the Habeas Corpus Case however, the court sought to distinguish
the previous decision. This was done on two grounds; one, that the reference to
this aspect in Makhan Singh Tarsikka's case was mere obiter dictum 29 and two,
that the order of 1962 was conditional unlike the order of 197530. Both these
distinctions appear to be flawed.
In the first place, with regard to the reference in Makhan Singh Tarsikka's
case about challenges being permissible on other grounds, the court did in fact go
into the merits of one such challenge on the ground of the Defence of India Act,
being a colourable legislation' . This is more than indicative of the fact that such
a reference was not a passing reference. Further, even if it is conceded that the
mention of other grounds was obiterdicta, why is such an obiter,not binding on a
subsequent co-equal bench3 2 ? Secondly, as mentioned earlier, both the orders were
conditional to the extent that they restricted an enforcement on the grounds only
of violation of the rights contained in Articles 14, 21 and 22. It is wholly
inconsequential that while the former provided for the deprivation under the Defence
of India Act, the latter did not specify any legislation. Therefore, the argument that
the orders were substantially different is not a sound one.
The effect of the order was that if the State authority detained an individual
on its whim, the detention order could not be challenged during the pendency of
27 On this point, there appears to be an inherent contradiction in the judgement. In the main body
of the judgement, three of the five judges accepted the position that the detaining authority
needed to possess the authority to make the detention before the courts could dispose of the
petition. In the final order however, the bench concluded that a challenge based on the detaining
authority acting beyond its authority was not permitted, because no person had the locus standi
to do so. See, H. M. Seervai, supra., n. 22 at p.1644.
28 Supra., n. 4.
29 (1976) 2 SCC 521, 562.
30 Ibid. at p.5 4 2 .
31 Supra., n. 4 at p.386.
32 Article 141 of the Constitution merely uses the phrase "...law declared by the Supreme Court".
An obiter observation is a discussion of a point of law in the absence of its direct application to
the facts and circumstances.of the case at hand. Such an observation would therefore also amount
to a declaration of law under Article 141 and would have the same binding effect as a ratio
decidendi. See, A. M. Bhattacharjee, MatrimonialLaws and the Constitution, 8 (1996).
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the emergency. Even if the authority detained an individual without the authority
of a substantive law, the detention was to be deemed valid. While some of the
judges in this case, specifically stated that the detention had to be under a valid
law, the final order passed forbade a challenge even if the detention was without a
valid law.
Another startling conclusion reached by the court was that Article 21 of the
Constitution was the sole repository of the rights to life and personal liberty and
when the enforcement of Article 21 was suspended, the right to life could not be
enforced under any other law33 . This immediately raises the question whether it
would have been better to have done away with Article 21 from the Constitution.
If it had not been mentioned in Part III, then it could not have been taken away
either, it would have continued to exist as a natural right and as a common law
right. By mentioning it explicitly, the result was to abrogate its existence in these
other forms34 .This seems to be an inherent paradox in the reasoning of the Supreme
Court.
- The Supreme Court in this case seems to have taken an idealist position",
placing too much reliance on the bonafide intentions of the executive. Sadly, the
series of custodial deaths and human rights violations that came to light following
the emergency proved the Court wrong3 6 .
33 Supra., n. 29 at p.530.
34 "...The only right to life and liberty is enshrined in Article 21.. .If any right existed before the
commencement of the Constitution and the same right with its content is conferred by Part M as
a fundamental right, the source of that right is in Part III and not in any pre-existing law". See,
ibid. (per Ray, C.J.) How correct is such an interpretation? While it can be said that Part ifi of
the Constitution no doubt makes certain rights fundamental and absolute, in doing so does it
abrogate the existence of those rights under other statutes or laws? This cannot be true. For
instance, while Article 19(1)(g) gives citizens the right to carry out any lawful profession, this
right cannot be realised but for other laws such as those relating to the Sale of Goods and
Contracts. The right to enter into a contract is no doubt one covered by Article 19(1)(g), but this
cannot abrogate the right under the Indian Contract Act, without which the right would be
useless. The only purpose therefore that Part III serves is to make the right fundamental and
basic. Part m therefore cannot contain every single right an individual is entitled to. Further
strength is lent to this argument by the change introduced by way of the 44th Amendment,
which included the right to property under Article 300A.
35 "...we understand that the care and concern bestowed by the State authorities upon the welfare
of the detenus who are well-housed, well-fed and well-treated, is almost maternal." (per Beg, J.)
This is reflective of the Supreme Court's ignorance of the ground realities. The question that
arises is whether the Supreme Court was truly ignorant or whether the decision was one of
political necessity. See, H. M. Seervai, supra., n. 22 at p.1635.
36 For a detailed critique of the entire judgement See, H. M. Seervai, supra., n. 22 at pp.1635-1683.
Several other important observations were made by the court. One important one was that during
an emergency the only rule of law that operated was that envisioned in Part XVIII. Another
important observation was that there was no natural law or common law right to the writ of
habeas corpus.
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While the judgement of the majority in the HabeasCorpus case was clearly
nothing short of outrageous, special mention must be made of the dissenting
judgement delivered by Justice Khanna. His judgement stood as the lone voice
seeking to uphold the cherished ideals of a rule of law and non-arbitrariness
fundamental to any democratic setup. To date his judgement stands as one of the
few reminders of India's commitment to democratic ideals during the darkest years
of the emergency 37
The decision in the Habeas Corpus case was relied upon and followed in
the subsequent decision of Bhanudas Krishna Gawde v. Union of India38 . Here
the court reiterated the same propositions and concluded that it would not enforce
the right to life indirectly through any natural or common law right.
Thus, under the emergencies of 1971 and 1975 and the order under Article
359 issued during the later one, the fundamental rights under Part III were literally
obliterated. Unbridled and unrestricted power was placed in the hands of the
executive. The scales were literally rendered vertical in favour of the state's authority
vis-A-vis individual liberties. This position lasted till 1977, when the proclamation
was revoked. Subsequently, by certain constitutional amendments, the propositions
put forth were rendered nugatory. While the Habeas Corpus case may have no
more than historical value today, it nevertheless serves as a reminder of the blatant
abuse of power that took place during the emergency of 1975 and the inability of
the Supreme Court to deal with it effectively.
Subsequent Developments
With the revocation of the emergency and the election of a new government
at the centre in 1977, several amendments were made to Part XVIII of the
Constitution. The primary focus was to prevent a blatant abuse of power as had
been carried out in the preceding years.
These changes were made mainly by the 4 2 nd and 4 4 th Amendment Acts of
1976 and 1978 respectively. One of the fundamental changes made to Article 352,
mentioned earlier was the substitution of the phrase 'internal disturbance' with
37 "Rule of law is the antithesis of arbitrariness.. .the accepted norm of civilised societies. One of
the essential attributes of the rule of law is that executive action to the prejudice of or detrimental
to the right of an individual must have the sanction of some law." See, supra., n. 29 at pp.539540. Justice Khanna concluded his judgement with the moving words, "Adissent in a court of
last resort... is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day,
when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes
the court to have been betrayed." See, H. M. Seervai, supra., n. 22 at p.1636.
38 (1977) 1 SCC 834. This case related to detentions under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange
and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA).
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that of 'armed rebellion'. This was primarily because the emergency of 1975 had
been proclaimed on the ground of 'internal disturbance'.
With regard to Articles 358 and 359, the most important change that was
made was in clause (1) of Article 35931. With the change, the President was now
permitted to restrict the enforcement of any of the rights in Part III except those
contained in Articles 20 and 21. Thus, the fundamental right to life and personal
liberty has been made absolute. Going by the proposition that Article 21 is the sole
repository of the fundamental right to life, then this would mean that this right
cannot be abrogated during an emergency too, except by a 'procedure established
by law' as mentioned in Article 21.
Further, following the dictum laid down in Maneka Gandhi40 , that any law
to stand the test of Articles 14, 19 and 21 had to be just, fair, right and reasonable,
the possibility of a repeat of the emergency actions seems remote. Thus any
procedure providing for detention during the emergency will now have to stand
the tests of non-arbitrariness, reasonableness and must contain the basic principles
of natural justice for it to be valid.
For any law made in accordance with Articles 358 and 359 contravening
the rights specifically mentioned 'therein to be granted immunity from being
challenged as violative of Par III, the law must contain an explicit recital that it is
in relation to the Proclamation under Article 352.
Several other minor modifications were made to Articles 352, 358 and 35941
As a result of all these changes, the position as it stands today seems to be that the
decision in the HabeasCorpus case is no longer good law. While there still exists
ample scope for executive abuse of these provisions, they nevertheless have sought
to plug several of the more apparent loopholes that existed earlier.
Conclusion: The Supremacy of Basic Liberties?
The Indian experience with regard to the impact of a proclamation of
emergency on fundamental rights reveals impetuous variations at different points
of time. During the emergency of 1962 and the Presidential order passed under
39 By the 44th Amendment Act, 1978.
40 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597.
41 Such as the inclusion of a clause, providing for the coming into force of Article 358
only when
an emergency is proclaimed under Article 352 on the grounds of war or external aggression;
the introduction of a proviso to clause (2) of Article 359 providing for the extended
geographical
application of an order issued thereunder only when the President is satisfied about
the necessity
of such an application; the introduction of a provision in Article 352 for the
proclamation of a
national emergency even before the security of India is actually
threatened, but when the
occurrence of such a threat is imminent.
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Article 359 during its pendency, the courts sought to strike a fine balance between
the necessity of equipping the state with increased powers and individual liberties.
In 1971 and 1975 this approach was completely done away with. Fundamental
rights and basic liberties were almost totally abrogated. This period looked to
destroy the basic ideals that Indians had struggled for under colonial repression.
After the revocation of the emergency, several changes have been made to ensure
the supremacy of certain basic liberties.
The Indian experience relating to fundamental rights during the proclamation
of an emergency over the last 50 years represents the process of the Indian politicolegal machinery maturing. This process of maturation has witnessed the
transformation of a system from one with close to no regard for basic human
liberties to one where certain liberties are held inalienable and supreme. This process
is but a representation of an increasing political consciousness both among the
legislature and the judiciary. The process, it may be added is far from complete. It
however is undoubtedly a step towards the progressive evolution of the Indian
Constitutional machinery.
Nevertheless, any legal and political machinery is capable of being abused.
The changes instituted by the 4 2 nd and 4 4th Amendment Acts are capable of being
abused too. It therefore, must be reiterated that a judicious use of the emergency
provisions can never be assured completely. It depends to a large extent on the
government's commitment to democratic ideals and more importantly on the
judiciary's readiness to ensure this commitment.
Hopefully, having learnt several lessons from the emergency of 1975 and
the atrocities committed on the pretext of preserving the *security of the nation', a
greater commitment will be seen from all the organs of the State towards ensuring
the basic ideals of democracy. Nevertheless, only time can tell conclusively.

